CDTA proposal · October 15, 2026
One Number for Texts and VRS Calls
Draft proposal for discussion, not an available service or an approved regulatory requirement.
Draft proposal for discussion
Not an available service or an approved regulatory requirement. By Dean McCracken, Canadian Deaf Telecom Alliance (CDTA). Proposal date: . Published as a draft; publication does not establish that it was emailed, received, approved or formally filed with the CRTC. The website publication date appears separately in the header.
The goal
CDTA proposes an optional assessment and pilot allowing Deaf users to keep their existing mobile number for text messages and for telephone calls made or received through a qualified VRS interpreter. Users should not have to explain two contact numbers whenever an organization needs to call back or send a security code.
Users who prefer a separate VRS number, or do not have a mobile subscription, must retain dependable VRS access.
Background: why integration matters
Canada VRS’s registration guidance distinguishes the cell phone number receiving a verification text from the unique ten-digit VRS number assigned afterward. [1]
During a refund-related call on October 15, Dean reports explaining that his mobile number was for SMS and security codes and his VRS number was for interpreted calls. The agent understood. The experience nevertheless illustrates the difficulty of managing separate contact numbers.
The separate October 15 incident report describes video freezes and disconnections. Their technical cause is not established. They are not proof that VoIP caused the failures or that changing numbers would prevent them.
Requested service design
- Text messages and security codes
- SMS addressed to the primary mobile number should continue to reach the user’s mobile messaging service directly. Test short-code delivery and verification compatibility. Interpreters should not receive users’ SMS inboxes or automatically collect security codes.
- Incoming calls
- Calls to the same number should reach VRS through a supported arrangement authorized by the user.
- Outgoing VRS calls and callbacks
- The verified primary number should be available as caller ID through an authorized carrier-supported arrangement, respecting caller-ID blocking choices. Organizations should be able to call back that number and reach the user through VRS.
- Voicemail
- Provide secure, accessible retrieval and understanding of relevant mobile-carrier voicemail as well as VRS messages, with interpretation into ASL or LSQ when requested. ASL and LSQ are distinct signed languages.
This is a proposal for services connected around a user-controlled number. It does not ask for duplicated SIM cards, an unverified displayed number or weaker identity checks.
Background: what existing forwarding supports
Canada VRS says incoming calls can be forwarded from a primary number to the VRS number and warns that carrier charges may apply. [2] TELUS’s business-mobile guidance explains that call forwarding leaves text and multimedia messages delivered to the user’s device. [3]
These are starting points, not evidence that the entire proposal is available. Incoming forwarding alone does not establish outgoing caller-ID integration, accessible voicemail, reliable transfer recovery or support across carriers.
Integration does not mean eliminating IP-based calls
The GSMA describes VoLTE as voice carried over IP through an LTE network. [4] Modern mobile voice can therefore also use IP. CDTA seeks better integration between a user’s contact number, messaging and interpreted calls, not a ban on all IP-based calling. Reliability needs separate investigation and measurement; number integration would not automatically fix video freezes.
CDTA’s requested assessment and pilot
Service design and responsibility
CAV, interested vendors and telecommunications providers should document incoming and outgoing calls, SMS, voicemail and number changes, including who resolves failures at each stage. An app interface alone should not be presented as a complete carrier-integrated service.
Privacy and security
Verify the user’s authority over the number, protect against unauthorized changes and preserve appropriate caller-ID authentication. The CRTC describes a caller-ID authentication framework for IP-based calls. [5] The proposed design should account for it while keeping SMS and security codes private. Do not promise compatibility with every verification system without testing; retain accessible, secure alternatives.
Real-world testing
Deaf users and interpreters should test complete transactions: incoming and outgoing calls, callbacks, automated menus, transfers and SMS verification while video remains usable. Include voicemail, disconnections, an unavailable VRS app, carrier changes and vendor changes. Emergency-service testing must be formally coordinated with the appropriate providers; it must not involve casual calls to emergency numbers.
Choice, cost and continuity
Participation should be optional, preserve existing mobile numbers where supported, protect access for users without mobile plans and avoid additional accessibility-related forwarding charges. Users should be able to leave the arrangement without losing ordinary mobile messaging or dependable VRS access.
Open technical requirements
Appendix 3 of CRTC 2025-54 includes requirements for public telephone-network access and non-proprietary VRS technology using accepted, evolving technical protocols. [6] CDTA asks that a single-number assessment build on these principles. The policy is not being presented as an existing mandate for a single mobile/VRS number.
CDTA asks CAV and participating carriers for a written feasibility assessment and a user-tested pilot with responsibilities, target dates and measurable outcomes. Any regulatory decisions needed should be identified. CDTA asks the CRTC to identify the appropriate process for considering necessary changes. These are requested improvements, not commitments by those organizations.
Related record and project boundaries
The incident report remains separate from this proposal. Later evidence, responses and submission status should be identified and dated separately.
This advocacy proposal belongs on CDTA. Future experimental demonstrations may be developed separately through XCTLab, with portfolio attribution on xct.guru linking back to CDTA. Such work should use synthetic data. No prototype is an approved VRS provider, and this proposal requires no purchase of an XCT product.
One primary number. User choice. Reliable interpreted calls. Private messages.
References
Official background sources reviewed October 15, 2026. They support the cited background facts, not the availability or approval of the full proposal. The incident is Dean McCracken’s reported experience, not an independently established technical finding.
- Canada VRS — Get VRS, registration steps 4 and 5
- Canada VRS — Frequently Asked Questions, G22
- TELUS Business — Set up call forwarding on business mobile device
- GSMA — VoLTE (Voice over LTE)
- CRTC — Caller ID Spoofing, caller-ID authentication
- CRTC — Telecom Regulatory Policy 2025-54, Appendix 3, requirements 17 and 19
